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DEUTERONOMY — 12:31 abhorrent

DEUT591 There is one other provision in Jewish law for military intervention. As I turn to it, keep in mind that these materials are highly theoretical. I frankly doubt that any Jewish regime would or should act on them. The Bible zealously establishes a strict monotheism for Israel, and it claims that God was dispossessing the seven Canaanite nations because they engaged in idolatry and other “abhorrent things.” (Deuteronomy 12:29-13:1). Extending this thesis through a rather implausible interpretation of Genesis 2:16, the rabbis deduced six laws that, they claimed, had been given to Adam, and Genesis 9:4 provided another, for a total of “seven laws given to the children of Noah.” The first six laws forbid murder, incest and adultery, idolatry, blasphemy, theft, and tearing and eating a limb from a living animal and the seventh requires that a government be instituted to enforce these laws and provide for the general order of society. (Genesis Rabbah 16:6, B. Sanhedrin 56a, and M.T. Laws of Kings 9:1. Compare Novak (1983) The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism: An Historical and Constructive Study of the Noahide Laws. Edwin Mellen Press) for an extensive study of these laws). If a non-Jew fails to follow these laws, he is subject to capital punishment. B. Sanhedrin 57a. Maimonides summarized the law this way: “We kill any non-Jew who is under our power if he does not accept the commandments enjoined upon the children of Noah. Moses, our Teacher, bequeathed the Torah and commandments only to Israel, as Scripture says, ‘An inheritance for the congregation of Jacob,’ [Deuteronomy 33:4] and to anyone from the other nations of the world who wants to convert, as Scripture says, ‘or you as for the stranger [convert].’ Numbers 15:15 But if anyone [of the other nations] did not want [to accept the Torah and commandments,] we do not force him to do so. Moses, our teacher, similarly commanded at God’s bidding to force all inhabitants of the world to accept the laws enjoined upon the children of Noah, and anyone who does not accept them shall be killed.” M.T. Laws of Kings 8:9-10 This does not justify holy wars, much as it might seem to do so. Later on Maimonides himself specified that the death penalty can be imposed only after a trial, albeit with modified evidentiary and procedural rules, Ibid., 9:14 and thus it is unlikely that the Noahide rules provide any basis for military intervention. Several sources in the tradition specifically deny that Jews have the right, much less the duty, to impose the seven Noahide laws militarily outside the land of Israel; They apply only to non-Jews living in a Jewish state. (Compare Rashi on B. Sotah 35b (end), s.v. “v’katbu mi’limtah”; Sefer Mitzvot Gedolot, Negative Command #49; and Lehem Mishneh on M.T. Laws of Kings, 6:1.) Moreover one must remember that even if Maimonides’ dictum provides a rationale for military action, if the offenders make peace and accept the seven commandments, then, according to Maimonides himself, one must not kill a single person. M.T. Laws of Kings, 6:1. Thus it is doubtful that Jewish law would condone military intervention to enforce the seven Noahide Laws.

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DEUTERONOMY — 14:1 shattered

DEUT667 How, though, were those who remained part of the Jewish people supposed to interact with those within the field with whom they disagreed? One rabbinic source addresses the degree to which a community can tolerate diversity of practice. In interpreting the play on words based on Deuteronomy 14:1 that leads the Rabbis to the principle that Jews should not split into factions, (Sifrei Devarim 96; 346). Rabbi Yohanan (third century, Israel) and Abayye (fourth century, Babylonia) proclaimed that that principle precludes multiple practices in one locale, but communities in distinct areas could follow disparate rulings in observing the law. Rava, Abayye’s contemporary and sparring partner, was more permissive. For him the principle only prohibits the members of a given court from issuing conflicting rulings; They may disagree in discussion, but they ultimately have to make one, coherent decision. Two courts, however, even within the same city, could issue conflicting rulings without violating the principle. In tolerating this, Rava may have been thinking of the circumstances in large cities, where differing groups of Jews may live in close proximity to each other but practice Jewish law in distinct ways. (J. Pesachim 4:1 (30d); B. Yevamot 14a.) Members of the schools of Shammai and Hillel, however, served on the same courts. How did they agree on a ruling-- and even permit each others’ children to marry one another? According to one talmudic opinion, since the Hillelites were in the majority, the Shammaites accepted their authority in practice while remaining opposed in theory. Pluralism, on this model, stops with thought; uniformity is necessary in action, and that must be determined by the majority of the rabbis charged with making the decision. A second talmudic solution is that God prevented any cases prohibited in one view but not in the other from occurring. The third explanation is that both parties kept each other informed of problematic cases, and thus marriages between the families associated with the two schools could continue. (J. Yevamot 1:6 (3b); B. Yevamot 14a-b. Compare also T. Yevamot 1:12) In other words, they trusted the majority, they trusted God, or they trusted each other. (Reuven Kimelman, “Judaism and Pluralism.” Modern Judaism 7, no. 2 (May, 1987): 131-150, 136, put it this way).

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DEUTERONOMY — 14:1 shattered

DEUT668 Why do we [i.e., the Jewish people - AJL] need to hold together in the first place? That is, why is Kelal Yisrael, the Jewish community as a whole, a value for the Jewish tradition and for us? The need for unity is, in part, political and social. Only a cohesive community can prevent anarchy and plan joint action to protect and enhance Jewish life. For the Rabbis, though, the motivation is also theological. A play on words based on Deuteronomy 14:1 leads the Rabbis to the principle that Jews should not split into factions. Sifrei Devarim 96, 346. Unity thus accords with God's commandments, and it also is required for God's recognition and glory: “When Israel is of one mind below, God's great name is exalted above, as it says, ‘He became King in Jeshurun when the heads of the people assembled, the tribes of Israel together’ (Deuteronomy 33:5).” Ibid., 346. If, on the other hand, communities are splintered, the various groups look as if they were guided by two different Torahs or even by two different Gods. B. Yevamot 13b; Hiddushei Haritba on B. Yevamot 13b. This can undermine respect for religious institutions and, ultimately, for religion itself. Furthermore, a divided Jewish community cannot effectively accomplish its religious mission of being “a light of nations” and perfecting the world under the dominion of God. (The image of Israel as a light to the nations is in Isaiah 42:6; 49:6; compare 60:3). Those who hold unity as the exclusive or paramount goal sometimes seek to attain it by claiming that there is only one correct view and that all others should be shunned or even attacked. Unfortunately, there is ample precedent for this approach in Jewish history. One account of the relationships between the first-century school of Shammai and its rival school of Hillel, for example, depicts the former as ambushing and killing all but six members of the latter. (M. Shabbat 1:4 and J. Shabbat 1:4 (3c); compare also B. Shabbat 17a and Josephus, The Jewish War, Book IV, passim). In the eighteenth century, eastern European Jews were split between Hasidim and mitnagdim who issued bands of excommunication against each other and prohibited members of each group from engaging in communication or commerce with members of the other. But that is not the only-- and certainly not the predominant-- Jewish model for attaining unity. In Deuteronomy 17, God commands that we abide by the decisions of the contemporary court, and that is the basis for judicial authority and communal conformity. (Deuteronomy 17:11). That demand, though, is effectively balanced by another commandment in that same book of the Torah that we “fear no man, for judgment is God’s.” (Deuteronomy 1:17). Traditional sources accordingly document a dynamic pluralism within the Jewish community. There are seventy faces to each passage in the Torah, according to the Rabbis, and Moses was not told the final decision on each matter of law” so that the Torah may be capable of interpretation with forty-nine points pro and forty-nine points contra.” (Numbers Rabbah 13:15-6 and J. Sanhedrin 4:2 (22a). People should listen to each other and be prepared to change their minds on legal matters, says the Mishnah, and the opinion of a dissenting judge is recorded because in a later generation the court may revise the law to agree with him. (M. Eduyot 1:4-5). Just as the manna tasted different to each person, so too, say the Rabbis, each person hears God's revelation according to his own ability. (Pesikta de-Rav Kahana, “Massekhet Bahodesh Ha-shlishi,” on Exodus 20:2. Compare also Exodus Rabbah 5:9 and 29:1). The long tradition of finding a variety of rationales for the laws and suggesting a variety of interpretations of the biblical stories is the sum and substance of the Midrash aggadah, and the very methodology used in Jewish law encourages debate. (Hartman, Joy and Responsibility (1978), 130-161). One should, therefore, study with at least two rabbis to learn their diverse approaches to Judaism and the techniques for analyzing competing positions: “One who studies Torah from [only] one teacher will never achieve great success [literally, ‘a sign of blessing’].” B. Avodah Zarah 19a.

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DEUTERONOMY — 15:11 open

DEUT809 While “there will never cease to be needy ones in your land,” we are not permitted to sit back and apathetically let that situation persist. Hence Deuteronomy 15:11 continues: “which is why I command you: open your hand to the poor and needy kinsman in your land.” Judaism has accepted the continuous nature of the problem of poverty but is anything but fatalistic about it. On the contrary, in both theory and practice Jews have assumed throughout history that it is within our ability to provide for the poor and that it is our sacred task to do so. In this, all of the Jewish convictions described in the first section of this chapter play a role, but perhaps the fundamental, underlying principle is the dignity of the human being created in the image of God. Fulfilling the duty to care for the poor makes it possible for a fellow human being and perhaps a fellow Jew to escape the slavery of poverty and live as a respected member of the community, thereby gaining the status of free individuals that we all need and deserve. Preventing poverty and honorably assisting the poor are nothing short of holy activities. In making these aims our priority, we act as human beings should and imitate no less an exemplar than God: “If your kinsmen, being in straits, comes under your authority... let him live by your side as your kinsman. ... I the Lord am your God who brought you out from the land of the Egyptians to be their slaves no more, who broke the bars of your yoke and made you walk erect.” (Leviticus 25:35-36 and 26:13).

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DEUTERONOMY — 16:20 justice

DEUT848 “Justice, justice shall you pursue” (Deuteronomy 16:20) rings through the ages as one of the Torah’s major principles. The biblical prophets rail against the people for their failure to achieve justice, and they issue clarion calls for reform that have shaped the conscience of Western civilization for thousands of years. “Justice, justice shall you pursue” appears after several verses in the Torah that demand the institution of courts located in all regions where the people dwell, that prohibit bribes, and that warn against prejudice and judgement. By mixing procedural concerns (like the placement of courts in convenient places) with substantive issues (like the prohibitions against bribes and prejudice), the Torah indicates its awareness that the two are inextricably intertwined, that procedure affects substance and substance demands certain procedural rules. No human being can always know whose cause is right, for only God is privy to the sum total of every person's actions and intentions. Nevertheless, the Torah obligates us to establish courts to dispense justice as well as we can, and it specifies procedural rules to help us do that well. So, for example, at least two witnesses are required to establish a fact in court in order to forestall collusion. (Deuteronomy 17:6 and 19:15). To accentuate its prohibition of false testimony, the Torah includes it in the Decalogue, announced amid thunder and lightning at Mount Sinai. (Exodus 20:13. See also Exodus 23:1-2 and Deuteronomy 5:17). Moreover, a twenty percent fine is levied against witnesses who knowingly lie in a civil case, (Leviticus 5:20-26) and full retribution is required of those who testify falsely in a criminal case. (Deuteronomy 19:15-21). A judge’s acceptance of bribes is roundly condemned, “for bribes blind the clear sighted and upset the pleas of those who are in the right.” (Exodus 23:8 and Deuteronomy 16:19). Each person is to be judged for his or her own actions exclusively, (Deuteronomy 24:16), a principle assumed without question in modern Western societies but very much at odds with the practice of many societies in ancient, medieval, and even modern times, in which relatives were punished for the crimes of their family members. The Torah insists that neither rich nor poor may be favored: You shall not be partial in judgment: hear out low and high alike. Fear no man, for judgment is God’s.” (Deuteronomy 1:17; see also Exodus 23:2-3, 6) The alien, too, is to be treated fairly: “Decide justly between any man and a fellow Israelite or stranger.” (Deuteronomy 1:16). The rabbis of the Talmud and Middle Ages added many more procedural rules to ensure impartial treatment. For example, one litigant may not be required to stand while the other is sitting, both parties to the case must wear clothing of similar quality, judges must understand the languages spoken by the people before them, and people related to each other or to the litigants may not serve as witnesses, and neither may those engaged in illegal or immoral activities. (B. Shavuot 30a, T. Sanhedrin 6:2, B. Ketubbot 46a, and M.T. Laws of Courts 21, esp. pars. 1-2.) Through rules such as these, procedural justice is strengthened and made reality.

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